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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND THE
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
In recent history, the authorityto commit US. troops to theatersofconflict has
shiftedfrom Congress to the President. After the Vietnam War, the War Powers
Resolution was written to reestablish balanced authority over war between the
politicalbranches of government. In the post-Cold War era,forcesfrequently are
deployed as part of multilateral UN. operations. This trend creates two
contradictoryneeds: first, the needfor the Executive to be able to act swiftly and
decisively in formulatingmilitarycommitments to the UnitedNations, and second,
the needfor Congressto authorizepotentially long-term militarydeployments. To
reconcile these contradictoryneeds, the Presidentshould be requiredto consult
with a small group of key congressionalactors before committing US. troops.to
multilateralUN, militaryoperations. There are both legal andsecurity rationales
for this. Centrally, Executive-congressional consultation re-solidifies the
constitutional allocation of war powers and may bolster US. credibility in
multilateraloperations.

INTRODUCTION
The disintegration of Cold War bipolarity fundamentally has altered the dynamics
of international security. As centrifugal political forces unleash new threats to
international politics, policymakers devise new solutions from existing paradigms of
diplomatic and strategic thought. The end of the Cold War and the construction of
the United Nations ("U.N.") as a framework for bolstering world security through
multilateral military initiatives have each contributed to a new debate about the
constitutionality of the American Executive's ability to deploy military force
independent of congressional authorization.'
American military deployments are increasingly part of a multilateral U.N.
Security Council ("Security Council") effort to counter threats to international
security and human rights.2 Arguably, this creates a mandate for a greater
centralization of the war power' in the Executive, with authority to act swiftly and
' In this Note, "multilateral" refers to military operations pursued by two or more
states. "Unilateral" refers to the Executive when it deploys troops into hostile or potentially
hostile theaters of combat without congressional authorization. Thus, the Executive can
unilaterally deploy troops as part of a multilateral military operation.
2 See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 148-61 (1995) [hereinafter FISHER,
WAR POWER] (discussing U.S. and U.N. cooperation in Kuwait, Somalia, and Bosnia).

' "War Power" is defined as "[tihe constitutional authority of Congress to declare war
and maintain armed forces (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14), and of the President to
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decisively through the American delegate to the U.N.4 Such an argument seeks to
expand executive authority in military affairs by relying on the President's
constitutional role as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of
the United States." 5 Alternatively, the trend towards multilateral U.N. military
actions may bolster the mandate for Congress to assert a stronger role in the use of
the U.S. military to pursue U.N. objectives. If American military involvement is
challenged by congressional discontent or even by congressional approval when
approval comes too slowly to give certainty to American commitments, the
commitment to protect international security may prove unenforceable when the
Security Council decides to counter a belligerent state,. This argument seeks to
expand legislative authority in military affairs by relying on the legislature's
constitutional power to declare war and maintain military forces.6 Arguably, a swift
framework for assessing legislative approval would enhance international security by
allowing for a more rapid deployment.
This Note addresses whether the War Powers Resolution ("the Resolution")'
should be reinterpreted in light of the post-Cold War trend of Presidents to deploy
military force pursuant to Security Council Resolutions. Part I of this Note provides
background on the constitutional principles of war powers jurisprudence. Part II
delineates modern developments affecting war powerjurisprudence, including the role
of the Resolution in the U.N. framework for enhancing collective security. Part III
analyzes the need for a new approach for applying the Resolution to U.S. military
deployments under the aegis of collective security schemes, This Part also explores
the realist theory of international relations to illustrate the dynamics of collective
security and their effect on war powers jurisprudence. The Note concludes that the
Resolution should be reformulated to require executive consultation with a limited
group of legislators before major troop deployments are authorized under multilateral
security schemes.
Both the executive and legislative branches have a constitutional role to play in
the use of force, but the legislative branch has primacy in committing forces to hostile
theatres. History reveals, however, a shift in the war power from the legislative to the
conduct war as commander-in-chief (U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1)." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1578-79 (7th ed. 1999).
" See Jane E. Stromseth, Collective Force and Constitutional Responsibility: War

Powers in the Post-Cold War Era, 50 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 145, 159 (1995) [hereinafter
Stromseth, Collective Force] ("[T]he President may determine that aggression short of an

attack or imminent attack against the United States poses a threat to the country's security
that is serious enough to warrant dispatching American forces into combat within a time

frame that precludes prior approval from Congress.").
5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14.
7 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1994).
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executive branch. Executive authority in Vietnam revealed a strong need for
Congress to check executive power. An amended view of war powers and the
Resolution should now be constructed to meet the modem parameters of international
politics. A small subset ofCongress should have the ability to play an influential role
in executive troop commitments in a way that does not unconstitutionally impair the
President's ability to commit U.S. forces quickly to multilateral operations.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF WAR POWER JURISPRUDENCE
A. Introduction to War PowerJurisprudence

Modem constitutional scholars disagree on which branch of government the
Framers endeavored to vest with the power to initiate military hostilities. Under the
Constitution, the government's power in foreign affairs is divided between the
legislative and the executive branches of government; the judiciary has largely
refrained from taking an active role in foreign affairs.'
This debate is undergirded by the separation of powers doctrine, which holds that
power must be divided among different branches of government, thus mitigating the
ability of one branch to usurp all governmental power to the detriment of liberty.9 It
' See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 276
(1997) (noting that war power issues are likely to be dismissed by courts as political
questions). The Supreme Court has held: "the conduct of the foreign relations of our
Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative-'the
political'-Departments of the Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
9 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at I ("The division of powers among the
branches was designed to create a system of checks and balances and lessen the possibility
of tyrannical rule."). The doctrinal mandate for a separation of governmental power is often
attributed to the writings of John Locke and Charles Louis de Secondat, the Baron de
Montesquieu. See Suri Ratnapla, John Locke's Doctrine of the Separationof Powers: A
Re-Evaluation, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 189, 220 (1993) (defending the idea that John Locke's

ideas influenced the origins of the doctrine of separating governmental power against
academic critics who argue otherwise).
John Locke asserted:
But because the Laws, that are at once, and in a short time made, have a
constant and lasting force, and need a perpetualExecution, or an attendance
thereunto: Therefore 'tis necessary there should be a Power always in being,
which should see to the Execution of the Laws that are made, and remain in
force. And thus the Legislative and Executive Power come often to be
separated.
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT § 144, at 382-83 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) (1690).
Montesquieu asserted:
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is useful to begin by analyzing the basis of arguments used by scholars to evaluate
the constitutional division of war power.'"
B. The Text of the Constitution
The text of the Constitution provides the starting point for an exploration of the
war power. Article I provides an extensive basis for legislative power in foreign
affairs. The legislature is vested with an impressive list of powers in foreign affairs,
including the power:
1. "To declare War, grant Letters of marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;''
'2
2. "To raise and support Armies;'

When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person,
or in the same body of magistracy, there can be no liberty; because
apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact
tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the power ofjudging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers. Were it joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge
would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge
might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.
CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. XI, ch.
6, 4-5, at 202 (David Wallace Carrithers ed., 1977) (1748).
0 War power jurisprudence is a rich field for scholarly debate. Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky notes that "the Constitution is an invitation to a struggle over control over the
power to declare and to conduct wars." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at 207. In addition,
he notes that resolutions to the debate are unlikely to come from the judiciary since "the
Court's view [is] that.., foreign policy disputes constitute a political question." Id at 208.
Thus, the debate is largely left to political actors and legal scholars.
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. A letter of marque and reprisal is "a license
authorizing a private citizen to engage in reprisals against citizens or vessels of another
nation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 917 (7th ed. 1999). Congress has not granted such
letters since the 19th century. See id In European legal history, these letters allowed
subjects to seek redress for claims by a foreign subject during times of peace or war. The
recipient was authorized to seize another nation's property or person(s). After the 18th
century, governments stopped granting letters to individual subjects but continued to grant
letters to naval vessels and private ships. This practice often led to war. See Charles A.
Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The OriginalUnderstanding,81 YALE L.J.
672, 693 (1972) (analyzing the Framers' understanding of English ideas about waging war,
pursuing reprisals, and safeguarding liberty); see also Jules Lobel, Covert War and
CongressionalAuthority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035

(1986) (analyzing letters of marque under international law).
2

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
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3. "To provide and maintain a Navy;"' 3
4. To regulate land and naval military forces; 4
5. "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;"' 5
6
6. To provide for organizing a militia;
7. "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations;"' 7
8. To regulate naturalization;
9. "To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;' 9 and
10. To give advice and consent to the executive branch in making treaties
and appointing ambassadors.2"
In addition, the Supreme Court has held, "Although there is in the Constitution
no specific grant to Congress ofpowerto enact legislation for the effective regulation
of foreign affairs, there can be no doubt of the existence of this power in the lawmaking organ of the Nation."'" The Legislature's extensive powers in national
security are not plenary, however. The Constitution creates an "invitation to
struggle"22 between the legislative and executive branches, which are each given
spheres of autonomy within an interdependent structure of national security power.
The Executive has the power:
1. To act as the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and ofthe militia of the several States, when called into
23
the actual Service of the United States;

, Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
14 Seeid. art. I, § 8, ci. 14.

"s Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
16 See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
17 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18 See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
19 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
20 See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
23

Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at

205 (analyzing the legislature's abilities in foreign policy).
22

EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, at 171 (4th

rev. ed. 1957). John Norton Moore asserts that 18th-century political theory "suggests far
less ambiguity than Professor Corwin notes is evident from a simple reading of the
constitutional text." JOHN NORTON MOORE ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 749 (1990).
For a discussion of 18th-century political theory and its influence on the Framers, see infra
notes 33-37 and accompanying text (analyzing Charles Louis de Secondat, the Baron de
Montesquieu, John Locke, and William Blackstone).
23 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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To repel sudden attacks;24
25
To "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed;,
To receive ambassadors; 26 and
To appoint ambassadors and to make treaties with foreign nations
with the advice and consent of the Senate."

In addition, it must be stressed that history reveals more than 125 instances in
which the President has authorized the use of military force, yet there have been only
five congressional declarations of war.28 Typically, the Executive's actions can be
linked to a congressional authorization or delegation to use force in specific
circumstances. 9
' See id art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (providing that a state can engage in war without the consent
of Congress if it is invaded or if danger prohibits delay). Arguably, this power to engage in
war without the consent of Congress can be claimed by the President when the nation is
attacked, or when consultation with Congress is impossible. See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL.,

National Security Law 11 (2d ed. 1997). This argument is bolstered by the statements made
by delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. See infra note 42 and
accompanying text (analyzing the statement of Connecticut's Constitutional Convention
delegate Roger Sharman).
21 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. This clause includes laws that deal with national security.
See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 24, at 10 (noting the constitutional division of power over
foreign affairs between the executive and the legislative branches of government). The duty
to execute the laws faithfully can entail an obligation to protect American citizens. See In
re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1(1890) (upholding the Executive's authority to protect a federal judge
in the United States). The executive power to protect citizens may extend to citizens abroad.
Under both customary and conventional international law, a state has the right to protect
its citizens abroad. See LINDA A. MALONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (1998)
("[A]dvocates... [assert] that attacks on a state's nationals triggers a right of self-defense
under a broad reading of [U.N. Charter] article 51 or as self-help under customary
international law.").
26

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.

27

See id art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR 145-

28 See FRANCIS

51 (2d ed. 1989) (asserting that the historical pattern of presidential deployments of military
forces without congressional authorization does not expand presidential war powers);
Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of UnitedStates Participationin the Defense of Vietnam,
54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 474 (1966) (asserting the constitutionality of the Executive's role in
involvement in Vietnam based on the SEATO treaty, a multilateral security treaty ratified
by the Senate that, Meeker argues, allows the President to determine when the treaty has
been violated, necessitating American intervention); Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential
War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REV. 19, 25-27, 30-31 (Special Issue 1970) (asserting that the
historical pattern of presidential deployments of military forces without congressional
authorization expands presidential war powers).
29 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President(Almost) Always Wins in ForeignAffairs:
Lessons of the Iran-ContraAffair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1263 (June 1988) ("The vast
majority of foreign affairs powers the President exercises daily are not inherent
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Some scholars conclude that the textual division of war powers separates the
President's relatively limited ability to repel sudden attacks from the Legislature's
relatively broad ability to wage war.30 Based on the Constitution alone, "the text tilts
decisively toward Congress.'
Other scholars disagree and assert that the Legislature's power to issue a
declaration of war is a limited power. This school of thought argues that a
declaration of war is merely a formality of eighteenth-century international law, an
argument that nullifies the assertion that the Framers' intent was to:vest the lion's
share of the war power in the Executive.32 An understanding of the legal ideas that
guided the Framers' thoughts provides additional material for analysis.
C. The English Legacy

Two schools of thought compete for viability in analyzing the Framers' intent.
Both schools invoke a different model of how the Framers viewed the English legacy
of war power jurisprudence.
The first model argues that the Constitution must be read against the backdrop
of three theorists who heavily influenced the legal thought of the Framers: Charles
Louis de Secondat, the Baron de Montesquieu, John Locke, and William
Blackstone. 33 These eighteenth-century theorists believed that war power must lie
constitutional powers, but rather, authorities that Congress has expressly or impliedly
delegated to him by statute.").

See, e.g., Louis Fisher, SidesteppingCongress: PresidentsActing Under the UN and

30

NATO, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1237, 1240 (1997) ("The constitutional framework
adopted by the Framers for the war power is remarkably clear in its basic principles. The
authority to initiate war lay with Congress. The President could act unilaterally only in one
area: to repel sudden attacks.").
31

W. TAYLOR

REVELEY

III, WAR POWERS

HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH?

OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO

29 (1981).

32 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Continuationof Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understandingof War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 206 (1996).

'[Eighteenth-century] [i]ntemational law scholars agreed that a declaration of
war was unnecessary either to begin or to wage a war, but rather was a courtesy
to the enemy .... A declaration also served notice on allies of the enemy that

they might become accessories to the war. A declaration constituted something
of a complaint in the international dispute resolution process of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries.
Id.

33 See

id at 198-204 (analyzing the writings of Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone as

favoring the authority of the Executive to wage war); see also David I. Lewittes,
Constitutional Separation of War Powers: ProtectingPublic and Private Liberty, 57
BROOK. L REv. 1083, 1093 (1992) (arguing that "Madison, Montesquieu, and Blackstone

agreed that the legislative and executive powers must be divided to preserve both public and
private liberties"). Lewittes concludes, "A declaration of war is not required for defensive
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with the executive branch because the legislative branch would be too slow and
ineffectual in war.34 Invoking these theorists, the first model asserts that the
Executive has primacy in the constitutional division of war powers.35

at 1189. But see
wars, which includes military action taken to defend other nations." Id.
FISHER, WAR POWER, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that the Framers were familiar with Locke
and Blackstone but ultimately rejected the English theory of vesting the war power in the
executive branch). Fisher uses the Continental Congress as a precedent to assert that the
"These models of executive
Framers rejected the models of Locke and Blackstone. See id.
that
their
forebears in England had
They
knew
power were well known to the framers.
committed to the executive the power to go to war. However, when they declared their
independence from England, they vested all executive powers in the Continental Congress."
Id.
4 John Locke wrote:
For since in some Governments the Law-making Power is not always in being,
and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to
Execution ...therefore there is a latitude left to the Executive power, to do
many things of choice, which the Laws do not prescribe.
LOCKE, supra note 9, § 160, at 393.
Montesquieu wrote, "[O]nce an army is established, it ought not to depend immediately
on the legislative, but on the executive power; and this from the very nature of the thing;
its business consisting more in action than in deliberation." MONTESQUIEU, supra note 9,
bk. XI, ch. 6, 62, at 212.
William Blackstone wrote:
[T]he king has also the sole prerogative of making war and peace. For it is held
by all the writers on the law of nature and nations, that the right of making
war, which by nature subsisted in every individual, is given up by all private
persons that enter into society, and is vested in the sovereign power: and this
right is given up not only by individuals, but even by the [e]ntire body of
people, that are under the dominion of a sovereign. It would indeed be
extremely improper, that any number of subjects should have the power of
binding the supreme magistrate, and putting him against his will in a state of
war.
I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 257 (Garland
Publishing, Inc. 1978) (1783).
" One justification for this argument is the idea that the Framers had fought the
revolution to gain the rights enjoyed by 18th-century Englishmen. Thus, their creation of
a constitutional division of war powers must be interpreted in conjunction with the ideas
of Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone, each of whom had prominence in the English legal
thought of the 18th century. The theorists vested the bulk of the war power in a sovereign
or king, who the Framers replaced with the Executive. See Yoo, supra note 32, at 197-98.
In addition, the Legislature may still operate as a check against executive power by wielding
its power over the appropriation of funds for military use. See id. at 201-02 (noting that
Montesquieu provides the Legislature with two checks against the Executive's control of
the military: (1)only the Legislature was granted the power to appropriate funds for
military use, and (2) the Legislature could terminate authorization for the army).
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The second model argues that the constitutional separation of the war power was
written to purposely reject the ideas of Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone insofar
as these theorists vested the war power in the Executive. 6 Thus, the second model
asserts that the Framers sought to vest the war power in the Legislature.37 Regardless
of which model seems more compelling, the constitutional division of the war power
is edified by turning to the views of the Framers themselves.
D. The Framers'Intent
1. The Constitutional Convention
In 1787, delegates from twelve of the thirteen original colonies met in
Philadelphia to devise the structure of American government." Their deliberations
survive from the records made by James Madison.3 9
On August 17, 1787, the delegates accepted a proposal from James Madison and
Elbridge Gerry.4" The proposal called for changing a single word in the draft of the
Constitution: rather than allowing the legislature to "make" war, the proposal
allowed the legislature to "declare" war.4" The discussion on the proposal suggests
that the Framers believed they were centralizing the war power in the Legislature
rather than in the Executive.

See, e.g., Fisher, supranote 30, at 1238 ("Throughout the debates at Philadelphia and
in the state ratifying conventions, delegates expressly rejected the [Lockean and
Blackstonian model of] monarchical power over external relations.").
37 See id at 1240 ("The constitutional framework adopted by the Framers for the war
power is remarkably clear in its basic principles. The authority to initiate war lay with
Congress.").
36

" See generally CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA (1966)

(analyzing the history and politics of the convention). Rhode Island did not participate in
the convention.
39 Some scholars assert that Madison's notes provide only a partial understanding of the
Framers' intent to demarcate the war power between the executive and legislative branches
of government. See, e.g., Lofgren, supra note 11, at 675 ("The main report of the one
debate which explicitly considered allocation of the war-making power occupies little more
than one page out of the 1,273 which contain the printed records of the Convention.").
Charles A. Lofgren notes that the delegates focused their efforts on creating a government
that ameliorated the deficiencies of government under the Articles of Confederation, and
"[c]riticism of the Confederation government.., had not included the complaint that the
Confederation was deficient in its ability to commit the nation to war." Id.
40

See JAMES MADISON, NOTES ON THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787, at 476 (Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (transcribing a portion of the debates held at the 1787
Constitutional Convention).
41 See id.
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First, Roger Sharman ofConnecticut believed the Executive should repel but not
initiate war.42 Sharman's view supports the argument that the Executive should not
have unilateral authority to initiate war.
Second, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts "never expected to hear in a republic
'
Gerry's view also
a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war."43
supports the argument that the Executive should not have unilateral authority to
initiate war.
Third, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut believed there was a difference between
making war and making peace: it should be difficult to make war but easy to make
peace. In addition, Ellsworth believed war to be a simple and overt declaration,
whereas peace is intricate.44 This supports the argument that the President should not
have unilateral authority to initiate war for two reasons. First, it would be easier to
make war if the President could initiate war without the support of Congress.
Second, it suggests that the Framers believed war would require a declaration. Thus,
Congress' constitutional authority to declare war enhances its authority to initiate
war and seemingly nullifies initiation by the Executive.
Fourth, George Mason of Virginia was against giving the war power to the
Executive or to the Senate alone.' 5 Like Ellsworth, Mason believed it should be
difficult to make war but easy to make peace.46 Mason's view supports the argument
that the Executive should not have unilateral authority to initiate war-again, because
it would be easier to make war if the President could initiate it without the support of
Congress.
Thus, the brief debate on the proposal suggests that the Framers endeavored to
allocate the war power between a legislative branch with the powerto initiate war and
an executive branch with the power to repel sudden attacks.
2. The Ratification Debate
After the Constitutional Convention, the Constitution went to the states for
ratification. This triggered debate between the Federalists, who favored the
Constitution and its emphasis on a powerful national government, and the
Antifederalists, who argued for vesting political power in state governments, rather
than the national government.47 After the Constitution's ratification, Federalist
writings ascended as the canonical exposition of the Framers' intent.4"
42

See id

43

Id.

See id
id
46 See id.
47 See CHEMERINSKY, supranote 8, at 10-11 (describing the ratification debate between
Federalists and Antifederalists).
48 The FederalistPapersconstitute the primary source of Federalist arguments. See id.
4

41 See
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Federalist arguments concerning the war power were asserted by Madison and
Hamilton. Madison's writing strongly suggests the war power lies with the Congress.
After the convention, he reflected, "The [C]onstitution supposes, what the History of
all [governments] demonstrates, that the Ex[ecutive branch] is the branch of power
most interested in war, & most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care,
vested the question of war in the Legisl[ative branch]."'49 Another Federalist, James
Wilson, argued thatthe Constitution "' is calculated to guard against [war]"' because
it limits the ability of a single man to "'involve us in such distress"' by vesting in the
Legislature the power to declare war."0
Hamilton's views survive in The FederalistPapersand they provide support for
the Legislature's constitutional authority to wage war. In Federalist No. 69,
Hamilton argued that the Constitution would vest the war power in the legislative
rather than the executive branch by clarifying the Executive's role as Commander in
Chief:
The President is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the
United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same
with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it.
It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction
of the military and naval forces.., while that of the British King extends
to the declaring of war and the raising and regulating of fleets and
armies; all which, by the constitution under consideration, would
appertain to the legislature.5 '

at 11 (noting that the Supreme Court regularly cites The FederalistPaperson the Framers'
intent). Federalists countered antifederalist discontent over the constitutional mandate for
a Legislature with the power to maintain standing military forces by arguing that standing
military forces would promote national security and deter surprise attacks. See Lofgren,
supranote 11, at 687. Hamilton, a Federalist, argued:
The authorities essential to the care of the common defence are these: To raise
armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both;
to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These powers ought to
exist without limitation; because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent
and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of
the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 111 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987).
The Federalists, however, focused primarily on "defending the national government
at 687.
without regard to a particular branch." Lofgren, supra note !1,
49 Letter ofApril 2, 1798, to Thomas Jefferson in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
312 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
'0 See Lofgren, supranote 11, at 685 (quoting James Wilson).
1' THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 48, at 353 (Alexander Hamilton).
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This passage suggests the President has a military role once war is declared, but has
52
no authority to initiate war.
E. Summary
Constitutional interpretation suggests that the Framers intended to vest the war
power in the Congress rather than the President and to prohibit the President from
unilaterally deploying troops to initiate war. The President, however, had important
military roles: first, he could use force to repel sudden attacks; second, he would
have political power over the military once war had been initiated. 3
As the next Part will reveal, the 200 years since the Constitution's ratification
have witnessed overlapping trends: first, an increase in the power of the executive
branch vis-A-vis the legislative branch; second, an increase in the need of the
executive branch to deploy troops quickly in response to security threats; and third,
an increase in the viability of multilateral organizations, notably the U.N., as a state
instrument for mitigating international security threats. These trends have influenced
the modern formulation of the war power and shown the need to balance this
formulation with viable approaches to international security.

See Lofgren, supra note 11, at 685 (noting that Hamilton, along with other Federalist
supporters of the Constitution, construed the Executive to have narrow powers while the
Legislature retained broad governmental power). Although Hamilton was sympathetic to
the need for a strong Executive, Lofgren's interpretation of Hamilton's position in
FederalistNo. 69 is bolstered by Hamilton's writing in FederalistNo. 74. In FederalistNo.
74, Hamilton asserts that the President is Commander in Chief "when called into the actual
service of the United States," because "[t]he direction of war" demands "power by a single
hand." THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 48, at 379-80 (Alexander Hamilton). Thus, the
President's authority begins when the military is called into service. A priori, the
President's authority cannot begin before this point; that is to say the Legislature must call
the military into service before the President takes Commander inChief authority. In
addition, the Commander in Chief Clause gives the President power to "direct" war, and
thus it presumably excludes the President from initiating war. This is bolstered by
Hamilton's writing in FederalistNo. 72. In FederalistNo. 72, Hamilton asserts that "the
direction of the operations of war" fall under the Executive's authority. THE FEDERALIST
NO. 72, supra note 48, at 369 (Alexander Hamilton).
13 See FISHER, WAR POWER, supra note 2, at 7 ("The President never received a general
power to deploy troops whenever and wherever he thought best, and the framers did not
authorize him to take the country into full-scale war or to mount an offensive attack against
another nation.").
52
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II. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING WAR POWER JURISPRUDENCE

A. The War Powers Resolution
American involvement in Vietnam was largely a product of executive decisions,
and it drained American lives and resources in a way that seemed to conflict with the
Framers' intention to vest the war power in the Congress. 4 As a consequence,
Congress passed the War Powers Resolution ("the Resolution") during the end of
American involvement in Vietnam." The Resolution was written by a Congress
dissatisfied with the Executive's ability to initiate and direct war, with little or no
inclination to seek congressional approval.56 Thus, in passing the Resolution,
Congress sought to set parameters on the Executive's ability to commit military
forces to combat. The Resolution codified limitations on the ability of the executive
branch to initiate unilaterally or to engage in military hostilities.
First, the President, acting as Commander in Chief, can introduce U.S. military
forces "into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances"" only on the basis of"(1) a declaration of

14

See DYCUS ET AL., supranote 24, at 239-46 (providing a brief history of the war and

its beginning).
5 The Resolution states:

It is the purpose of this chapter to fulfill the intent of the framers of the
Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both
Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use
of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 154 1(a) (1994).
56 See, e.g., DYCUS ETAL., supranote 24, at 254 ("Not until 1971 was
it disclosed that
the President and his advisers had kept a great deal from Congress that might have affected
its vote on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution."). The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed by
Congress on August 7, 1964. See id at 243. It resolved, "That the Congress approves and
supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary
measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent
further aggression" by the Communist regime in North Vietnam. See id; see also Dante
Fascell, War Powers and Congress, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 121, 124 (1995) (asserting that
the purpose of legislators who passed the War Powers Resolution was to gain greater
"communication between the Congress and the President" concerning the use of force).
Dante Fascell was a representative from Florida and a sponsor of the Resolution. See id.
at 121. He suggests that the congressional authorization of military deployment at the outset
of Vietnam was suboptimal because Congress was unsure of who the United States was
fighting: "the Chinese, the Russians, Ho Chi Min, Cambodia or Laos." Id. at 122.
" War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1994).
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war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by
attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. 58
Second, the President must consult with Congress "in every possible instance"
before introducing troops into hostilities or potentially hostile theaters.59
Furthermore, when the President deploys forces into such theaters, he is required to
consult regularly with Congress for the duration of the deployment. 0
Third, if the President deploys troops without a congressional declaration of war,
he must submit a report to Congress within forty-eight hours. The report must
describe: (1) the necessity of U.S. troop deployment; (2) "the constitutional and
legislative authority" for the deployment; and (3) the "scope and duration of the
hostilities."'"
Fourth, the President must withdraw the deployed troops after sixty days unless
Congress (1) "has declared war," (2) has extended the sixty-day time limit, or (3) is
"unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States."62 The
President can extend this sixty-day period by an additional thirty days if there is an
"unavoidable military necessity"63 to maintain a theater presence during the
withdrawal.
In short, the Resolution creates procedural safeguards against unilateral executive
action in military troop deployments. Scholars and legislators debate the
constitutionality of the Resolution, evaluating whether it represents an
unconstitutional attempt by the Legislature to delineate the constitutional authority
ofthe Executive."4 This debate continues today, but any pragmatic analysis must add
58 Id.

59 Id. § 1542.
60 See id.
61 Id. § 1543(a)(3). The consultation and reporting requirements of the Resolution have
been criticized heavily for their wording. As Professor Koh asserts:
Even when enacted, legislation expressly designed to check executive
adventurism has often failed because of faulty draftsmanship. The War Powers
Resolution, the most ambitious piece of foreign affairs "framework legislation"
enacted in the post-Vietnam era, offers three particularly glaring examples.
First, the Resolution's consultation requirements oblige the President to consult
"in every possible instance," but then allow the President to decide what that
term should mean. Second, the Resolution requires the President to consult
with "Congress" before he sends troops abroad, but does not specify how many
Members must be consulted or how far in advance. Third and most seriously,
the Resolution permits the President to file three different types of reports to
Congress upon committing armed forces abroad, but only requires the removal
of troops within sixty days when one of those three types has been filed.
Koh, supra note 29, at 1299 (quoting the Resolution).
62 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
63 Id. § 1544.
' See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionalityof the War Powers Resolution, 70
VA. L. REV. 101, 101-02 (1984) (asserting that the Resolution is constitutional "because it
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new variables into the equation. Paradoxically, Section 1547(a) of the Resolution
states that no pre-existing treaty should be construed automatically to grant the
President the authority to deploy troops unilaterally into situations where hostilities
are imminent,6 5 while Section 1547(d)(1) states that the Resolution is not intended to
alter pre-existing treaties. 66 At the time the Resolution was passed, a pre-existing
treaty, the U.N. Charter, arguably created an executive obligation to deploy troops
into combat whenever the Security Council decided to endorse multilateral force
deployments to counter belligerent acts of aggression.67 Some scholars assert that
this argument is dubious, positing, "[T]he mutual security treaties entered into by the
United States... made clear that no party was committed automatically to come to
the defense of any other party. '6 In any event, the role of the U.N. in post-Cold War
security considerations adds crucial variables into the modem interpretation of war
powers. The central point is that, regardless ofthe Resolution's earlier constitutional
status, the moderm role of multilateral operations under the U.N. suggests a need to
reformulate the Resolution.
defines the war power [and in so doing, merely defines] the word 'war' in Article I [of the
Constitution]"); The War Powers Resolution: A Debate Between ProfessorJohn Norton

Moore and FrederickS. Tipson, 70 A.B.A. J. 10, 10 (Mar. 1984) (providing arguments for
and against the constitutionality of the Resolution). As Professor Chemerinsky notes, the
debate on the constitutionality of the Resolution continues with little guidance from the
courts. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at 275-78 (explaining judicial reticence in war
power jurisprudence). One argument is that "[the] Constitution gives the President some
power to act on his own in foreign affairs .... Congress may not use its control over
appropriations ... to prevent the executive or judiciary from fulfilling Constitutionally
mandated obligations." Id. at 277 (quoting REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

S. Rep. No. 100-216, H. Rep. No. 100-433
(1987) at 473, 476 (Minority Report)).
65 See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) (stating the guidelines for
interpreting the Resolution).
66 See id § 1547(d)(1) (limiting the applicability of the Resolution).
67 See U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR,

68

Michael J. Glennon, UnitedStates MutualSecurity Treaties: The Commitment Myth,

24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 509, 524 (1986) [hereinafter Glennon, The Commitment]
(rejecting the notion that treaties can violate constitutional structures of power). Glennon
concludes:
[Mutual security] treaties-all of them-are clear in their express terms and
equally clear in their legislative history that under no circumstances is any
party required to take any military action. With regard to the United States this
qualification carries an important corollary: none of the treaties confers any
war-making power on the President that he would not have had in its absence.
This means that he is given no additional power to introduce the armed forces
into hostilities by any treaty, and it also means that, once the forces are
involved in hostilities, he is given no additional power to carry out any
otherwise unauthorized military operation.
Id. at 551.
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B. The UnitedNations Charterand the Security Council
The U.N. originated shortly after the end of World War II to provide the world
community with a procedural mechanism to pursue common goals and to negotiate
disputes.69 The locus of U.N. power lies in the Security Council. 70 Under U.N.
Charter Article 43, member states allocate their military troops to the Security
Council when necessary for maintaining international peace and security. 7 , Under
this original design, U.N. member-states would provide military forces pursuant to
"special agreements" issued by the Security Council; the provision of these forces
would allow the Security Council to deploy troops to counter a belligerent state.72
The special agreements authorizing the deployment of military forces would be
"subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes. 73
The U.N. Charter creates a framework for Security Council members to engage
in intervention or peacekeeping activities.74 Consequently, Security Council
negotiations under this framework are central to any U.N. response to international
security threats. This situation requires the American U.N. delegate, an appointee of
the Executive, to obtain authority to commit U.S. forces when such commitment is
See MOORE ET AL., supranote 22, at 194 (1990) (describing the origins of the U.N.).
John Norton Moore notes that:
[C]entral to the [U.N.] Charter was the resolve that it would be realistic to
enjoin states not to use force save in self-defense, because collective security
would be provided to ensure that rights would not be denied in a manner which
might threaten international peace. This collective security was to be provided
by the [U.N.] itself.
Id.
(citations omitted).
70 See id at 195. The Security Council is made up of five permanent members and ten
nonpermanent members. The permanent members are: (1) China, (2) France, (3) Great
Britain, (4) the United States, and (5) Russia (which holds a seat as a permanent member
that was initially held by the U.S.S.R.). Nonpermanent members rotate periodically and are
chosen from the remaining states within the U.N. General Assembly. See id
7"See U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1; see also Stromseth, Collective Force,supranote
4, at 146 ("The Security Council's repertoire of possible responses to threats to international
peace and security is considerable. Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, for
example, the Security Council can authorie collective military action on a major
scale ....).
72 See U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1-3; see also Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War
Powers: Congress, The President,and the United Nations, 81 GEO. L.J. 597, 598 (1993)
[hereinafter Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers] (noting that the Security Council could use
national contingents of military force once special agreements were reached; these
contingents would operate "assisted by a U.N. Military Staff Committee comprised of the
chiefs of staff of the five permanent Security Council members").
3 U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 3.
'4 See id.
art. 43, para. 1.
69
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necessary.75 Simply stated, the efficacy ofthe Security Council to oppose aggression
is reduced when the American U.N. delegate's commitment ofU.S. military resources
can be voided by Congress.76 Presidents have argued that the role of the United
States as a world leader can mandate military action, and they have further argued
that the President has the authority to pursue such action as Commander in Chief.77
C. The UnitedNations ParticipationAct
In 1945, Congress passed the United Nations Participation Act ("UNPA")78 to
codify American obligations to the U.N. and the Security Council. Under the UNPA,
the President acts through the American delegate to the U.N. to negotiate with the
other Security Council members to determine common positions.79
To protect against the unconstitutional deployment of American military
personnel, the UNPA requires Congress to approve of special agreements before
American military forces can be deployed in response to a Security Council call for
Once Congress makes this
military countermeasures under Article 43.8o
authorization, the President can deploy American troops without a congressional
declaration of war." Such actions were deemed to be "police actions" rather than
See Evaluating US. Foreign Policy: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Int'l
Relations, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of James A. Baker III, former U.S. Secretary of
71

State, Jan. 12, 1995), available in 1995 WL 10400, at *9 ("[D]espite the end of the Cold
War, American leadership remains imperative.").
76 See Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers,supranote 72, at 660 (noting that America's
foreign policy interests include "responding to threats to the U.N. Charter as they arise").
Stromseth also notes that the Truman Administration argued that "requiring specific
approval in each case before U.S. special-agreement forces could be used would undercut
the effectiveness of the Security Council, which needed to know in advance the forces it
could depend on in an emergency." Id. at 607.
17

For example, when President George Bush reflected on his ability to deploy military

troops to the Persian Gulf pursuant to a Security Council consensus to thwart aggression,
he said, "Though I felt after studying the question that I had the inherent power to commit
our forces to battle after the U.N. resolution, I solicited congressional support before
committing our forces to the Gulf war .... I didn't have to get permission from some old
goat in the United States Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait." Fisher, supra
note 30, at 1268 (1997) (quoting I PUB. PAPERS 13-14 (1991) and I PUB. PAPERS 995
(1992-93)).
78 See United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287(a)-(e)(1) (1994) [hereinafter
UNPA].
"' See id § 287.
so See id § 287(d).
SI

UNPA section 287(d) states:
The President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement or agreements with
the Security Council which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by
appropriate Act or joint resolution ...

to be made available to the Security
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acts of war.8 By balancing the needs of the executive and the legislative branches
under the U.N. Charter, this system was intended to provide the Security Council
with forces that could be used in emergencies. 3
Two crucial points must be stressed. First, existence of the special agreement
scheme evidences the importance of congressional authorization for the Presidentto
utilize military force under the sponsorship of the U.N. Second, the American
delegate to the U.N. must have authority to commit American military personnel
quickly to U.N. operations. Without this authority, the United States cannot use the
U.N. as a forum for pursuing a foreign policy designed to bolster international
security."
Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining international peace and
security in accordance with article 43 of said Charter. The President shall not
be deemed to require the authorization of the Congress to make available to
the Security Council on its call in order to take action under article 42 of said
Charter and pursuant to such special agreement or agreements the armed
forces.., or assistance providedfor therein ....

Id § 287(d) (emphasis added).
This approach reflects the conclusions Congress reached in ratifying the U.N. Charter.
Cf, Stromseth, Collective Force, supra note 4, at 155 ("[T]he Senate gave its advice and
consent to the U.N. Charter on the understanding that any special agreement making
American forces available to the Security Council would be approved by Congress in
advance.").
82

See Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers, supra note 72, at 608-10. Congress saw

legitimacy in the distinction between a "war" and a "police action." The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Report validated this view by distinguishing a police action:
Preventive or enforcement action by these forces upon the order of the Security
Council would not be an act of war but would be international action for the
preservation of peace and for the purpose of preventing war. Consequently, the
provisions of the Charter do not affect the exclusive power of Congress to
declare war.
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, S.

EXEC. REP. NO. 79-8, at 9 (1945).
However, referring to military conflict as a "police action" rather than a "war" does not
immunize an executive decision from a constitutional attack:
There can hardly be room for doubt that the framers...never imagined that they
were leaving [the authority] to the [E]xecutive to use the military and naval
forces ... for the purpose of actually coercing other nations, occupying their

territory, and killing their soldiers and citizens, all according to his own
notions of the fitness of things, as long as [the President] refrained from
calling his action war or persisted in calling it peace.
John Bassett Moore, in 5 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN BASSETT MOORE 196 (1944)
(emphasis added).
83 See Stromseth, Collective Force, supra note 4, at 151..52.
84 If the American delegate to the U.N. has little authority to commit troops because
neither he nor the President holds the power to commit troops to armed conflict, the ability

of the United States and the U.N. to counter security threats falls drastically. Requiring the

2000]

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ANDTHE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

743

D. Cold War Polarityand the SpecialAgreement Problem
The efficacy of the U.N. Charter Article 43 special agreement system was
nullified by the dynamics of Cold War political tension within the Security Council.
Special agreements never became a mechanism for U.N. activity. Cold War political
divisions created a politically divided Security Council, which seldom had the ability
to reach a consensus on collective security measures."' As a result, the Security
Council became another front for diplomatic tension. This effectively nullified the
special agreement as an instrument for giving Congress authority over American
military commitments to multilateral deployments under the Security Council.
Article 43's ineffectiveness was lamentable from a constitutional perspective that
mandates congressional inclusion in foreign affairs. Congress passed the UNPA with
delegate to wait for the often sluggish pace of Congress to reach a conclusion may help fan
the flames of aggression. See generally CONNIE PECK, THE UNITED NATIONS AS A DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 234-35 (1996) (providing suggestions for bolstering the efficacy of
the U.N.'s ability to initiate peacekeeping missions). Peck explains:
Whenever a peacekeeping operation is established, the [U.N.] SecretaryGeneral is obliged to go through the same procedure of approaching a range of
suitable governments to request their assistance. Delays are inevitable as
governments go through the necessary steps to determine if they wish to
contribute troops .... Lengthy procurement and bidding procedures slow down
the "start up" of such operations, as does the mismatch between troops and
equipment which results from the ad hoc manner in which the operations are
constructed. In the meantime, the situation often deteriorates badly,
complicating the military and humanitarian situation and making the
peacekeepers'job more difficult when they do finally arrive.
Id. at 233 (emphasis added). Peck's assertions about peacekeeping are equally valid for any
type of U.N. intervention; the military utility of rapid force deployment is high. See, e.g.,
Margaret P. Kams & Karen A. Mingst, The Evolution of UnitedNationsPeacekeeping and
Peacemaking: Lessonsfrom the Pastand Challengesfor the Future,in WORLD SECURITY:
CHALLENGES FOR A NEW CENTURY 200 (Michael T. Klare & Yogesh Chandrani eds.,

1998) (analyzing the history of U.N. intervention and noting that the U.N. mission into
Somalia was disadvantaged by the world community's dilatory response).
85 See PECK, supranote 84, at 2 (analyzing the effects of the Cold War on the Security
Council). Peck points out that ideological tension undermined the ability of the U.N. to
enhance collective security, the primary rationale for its foundation:
Once the Cold War had begun in earnest, neither bloc wanted the international
organization to have any say in its geopolitical sphere. Both refrained from
bringing problems from its side of the divide to the Council, and when the rival
bloc tried to have them considered, resolutions were vetoed before any action
could be taken. Thus, even major conflicts, such as the war in Vietnam, were
never raised in the Council. Moreover, problems not involving the superpowers
reached the Council's agenda only after they had attained crisis proportions,
at which point it was usually too late to intervene effectively.
Id. at 2.
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the belief that American commitments to use significant military force for U.N.authorized deployments would be the product of an Article 43 special agreement.8 6
When Article 43 became ineffective as a result of Cold War politics, the Security
Council simply shifted to using Article 42 as the basis for the use of force. 7 Article
42 is a more general provision that allows the Security Council to take action by air,
sea, or land forces when necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security after peaceful measures have failed.88 Unlike Article 43, it does not require
explicitly a special agreement, nor does it require deployments to be made "in
accordance with [each Nation's] respective constitutional processes."8 9
While the utilization of Article 42 ostensibly reinvigorated the possibility of
multilateral deployment during Cold War bipolarity, it did so without mandating the
congressional inclusion required under the Constitution and expected under the
UNPA.9° Cold War bipolarity eviscerated the viability of Article 43 and replaced it
See supra notes 81-82 (analyzing congressional perceptions of Security Council
procedures for military force deployments).
87 See generally Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN.Police Action in Lieu of War:
"The Old Order Changeth," 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 66 (1991) (endorsing the Security
Council's reliance on U.N. Charter article 42 for military actions). Thomas M. Franck and
Faiza Patel argue:
[T]he practice of the Security Council has evolved other means for taking
coercive measures, including the use of police forces raised ad hoc in response
to a specific threat to peace.... What emerges from the institutional history of
the years of stasis is not evidence that the Council's policing functions have
fallen into desuetude but, on the contrary, that the central idea of a globally
sanctioned police action was never abandoned; that the failure to implement
Article 43 merely led to organic growth and the alternative creation of police
action through invocation of Article 42, which does not require special
agreements.
Id.While this position may justify the Article 42 basis for Security Council military
initiatives as a matter of international law, it does not address whether the Article 42 basis
squares with constitutional divisions of power between the executive and legislative
branches of government.
88 See U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
89 Id., art. 43 para. 3; compare id.
art. 42 (no requirement for a special agreement) with
id.
art. 43 para. 3 (requirement for a special agreement).
90 See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 24, at 298 (analyzing the legislative history of the
UNPA). Dycus notes:
A majority in the Senate also were persuaded that special agreement forces
[made pursuant to article 43] would be used only in a "police action" of such
limited scope and duration that it would not constitute a "war" in either an
international or constitutional sense. [President Harry S Truman's] Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles testified that Congress's [sic] war powers would not
be implicated if"we are talking about a little bit of force to be used as a police
demonstration.... [But] if this is going to be a large volume of force which is
going to put a big drain on the resources of the United States or commit us to
86
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with Article 42 as the justification for force deployments, excluding Congress and
shifting the constitutional allocation of war powers from Congress to the President.91
To summarize, the Cold War era witnessed the fall of congressional authority
over military deployment and created constitutional problems for military
deployments that are amplified in the post-Cold War era. As the next Part will
illustrate, the Gulf War revealed that security threats can create a mandate for U.N.
or U.S. intervention.
III. ANALYSIS

A. The Problem: Balancingthe Framers' Intentfor a Legislative War Power with
the InternationalSecurity Mandatefor Executive Authority
The Framers' desire to vest the war power in the Congress could not anticipate
the collective security scheme delineated by the U.N. Charter and UNPA.
Notwithstanding that the President's modem control over war conflicts with the
Framers' intent, the problem is not the increase in executive power. There are
compelling reasons for the Executive to hold a quantum of war power that contradicts
the Framers' intent. Presidential authority to make troop commitments to U.N.
operations is necessary because the viability of policies designed to enhance
great and costly adventures, then the Congress ought to have a voice in this
matter."
Id. (quoting The Charterof the United Nations: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 79th Cong. 655 (1945) (statement of John Foster Dulles)).
"' See Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations

Charter, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 74, 78 (1991) (analyzing the UNPA). Glennon answers a
central question: If Article 42 does not require special agreements and congressional
authorization as prerequisites to military force deployments, but Article 43 does, which
article is binding? Glennon asserts that Articles 42 and 43 must be interpreted in light of
their purposes: "The only provision authorizing use of armed force by the Security Council,
Article 42, immediately precedes the only provision relating to the raising of armed forces
by it, Article 43." Id. at 77. In addition, Glennon notes:
The prevailing view in Congress when the UNPA was enacted was that the
only mandatory way for the Security Council to raise armed forces was
pursuant to special agreements concluded under Article 43 ....

The President,

prior to directing an American vote in the Security Council requiring the use
of force by the United States, was expected to seek congressional approval if
that approval would otherwise be required. The Charter was seen as conferring
no additional authority on the President to use United States armed forces in
hostilities; the President could not, by an affirmative vote in the Security
Council, confer upon himself power to use armed force that he would not
otherwise possess. The text of the UNPA makes that clear, as does a review of
its legislative history.
Id. at 78.
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international security and thwart aggression may depend on the ability of the
President's U.N. delegate to make concrete commitments in Security Council
negotiations.9 2 Rather, the problem remains that the historical increase in the
Executive's war power has taken place without a viable framework for checking that
power.93 Most profoundly, the Resolution has not been construed to balance two
contradictory demands of the post-Cold War world: the Constitution demands that
Congress have authority to initiate war, but American obligations under the U.N., as
well as American fofeign policy, both demand that the President must have authority
to commit troops to military hostilities. The War in the Persian Gulf against Iraq
illustrates these points.
The Persian Gulf War was precipitated by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's 1990
invasion of Kuwait.94 President Bush quickly deployed a force that grew to more
than 500,000 troops to thwart the aggression; this initial deployment was made
without consulting Congress as a whole; however, he did consult, from the outset of
the deployment, with selected members of Congress.95 After American troops had
92 See supra note 84.
11 See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE

PRESIDENT 326 (1985) ("More threatening [than the trend towards Presidential authority]
is executive activity cut loose from legislative moorings and constitutional
restrictions-presidential action no longer tethered by law.").
14 See generally, DYCUS ET AL., supra note 24, at 322 (analyzing U.S. involvement
in
the Persian Gulf).
9 See Eileen Burgin, Rethinking the Role ofthe War Powers Resolution: Congress and
the Persian Gulf War, 21 J. LEGIS. 23, 30 (1995) (explaining that President Bush justified
his disinclination to seek congressional approval by saying "I cannot consult with 535
strong-willed individuals. I can't do it, nor does my responsibility under the Constitution
compel me to do that." Id. (quoting George F. Seib, Secret Diplomacy May Become the
Pitfallfor President Bush, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1990, at A 10)); Fisher, supra note 30, at
1264 (noting that President Bush created a multinational alliance and sought the support
of the Security Council to support military action against Iraq). For a primary account of
President Bush's relations with Congress during the Persian Gulf War, see GEORGE BUSH
& BRENT SCOWCROFT, THE WORLD TRANSFORMED (1998). Before Congress had given
specific authorization for the United States to use force against Iraq, President Bush was
concerned about the possibility that Congressional discontent might undermine the success
Bush had achieved in garnering an international coalition to deter Iraqi aggression. See id
at 398 ("If [a congressional resolution to use force against Iraq] failed, it would undermine
not only our -credibility and our political leadership of the coalition, but also the
international efforts to reverse the invasion."); see also DYCUS ET AL., supra note 24, at
323:
Congress was not in session at the time [of the August 2, 1990
deployment], and the President did not call it back. On August 10, however,
[President Bush] sent a letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate 'in accordance with my desire that Congress be fully
informed and consistent with the War Powers Resolution.' The letter stated that
he had dispatched U.S. forces 'equipped for combat' to respond to the Iraqi
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been deployed, President Bush garnered support for military action in Kuwait from
the Security Council.9 6 As a consequence, the Security Council passed Resolution
678, which justified military action against Iraq to restore the security ofKuwait and
the Middle East.97 President Bush used Resolution 678 and the Security Council's
support for a military offensive to justify the executive initiation of war.98 After
American troops were deployed, President Bush sought and received approval for his
action from Congress."
'threat' along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border, 'pursuant to my constitutional
authority to conduct our foreign relations and as Commander in Chief.' He
added that he did 'not believe that involvement in hostilities is imminent.'
On August 28, President Bush briefed selected members of Congress at the
White House about Operation Desert Shield.

See Fisher, supra note 30, at 1264 (noting that President Bush's Secretary of State,
James Baker, reflected, "'From the very beginning, the President recognized the importance
of having the express approval of the international community if at all possible."' (quoting
96

JAMES A. BAKER III, THE POLITICS OF DIPLOMACY 304 (1995)).

" See Fisher, supra note 30, at 1265 (explaining that the Security Council's November
29, 1990 passage of Resolution 678 authorized all member states to use "all necessary
means" to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, and all' necessary means included military
action). Fisher also asserts that "Although the Security Council 'authorized' each nation
to act militarily against Iraq, the resolution did not compel or obligate member nations to
participate." Id.
98 See id at 1266-68 (analyzing the Bush Administration's arguments for executive
authority to initiate military hostilities against Iraq). President Bush's Secretary of Defense,
Richard Cheney, asserted to Congress:
As a general proposition, I can think that the notion of a declaration of war to
some extent flies in the face of what we are trying to accomplish here. And
what we are trying to accomplish is to marshal an international force, some 26,
27 nations having committed forces to the enterprise, working under the
auspices of the United Nations Security Council.
Crisis in the PersianGulfRegion: US. Policy Options and Implications: HearingsBefore
the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 101 st Cong. 701 (1990) (statement of Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney).
99 See Edward Keynes, The War Powers Resolution: A BadIdea Whose Time has Come
and Gone, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 343, 359 (1992) (arguing that Congress reluctantly voted to
authorize President Bush to use military force to carry out Security Council Resolution
678). Keynes further asserts that:
[N]either United Nations Resolution 678 nor the congressional resolution are
the functional equivalents of a declaration of war. If Congress cannot delegate
the war-making authority to the President, certainly it cannot delegate such
plenary power, through the commander in chief, to the United Nations or any
of its subsidiary organs.... [T]he United Nations does not possess sovereign
authority over its member states.
Id.
Arguably, the Bush Administration had made it politically unwise for Congress to
oppose the Security Council's authorization for force. See John J. Kavanagh, Note, US.
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Some congressional representatives and military personnel felt President Bush's
actions were an unconstitutional usurpation of the war power by the Executive and
a violation of the War Powers Resolution. Problematically, the executive initiation
of military force in the Gulf War left discontented representatives without legal
redress. 00 It seems clear that the Resolution must be interpreted to reconcile
contradictory goals: securing legislative authority to initiate war and securing the
efficacy of the Executive to implement international security schemes under a U.N.
aegis.
B. The Solution: International Security and the Mandate for Reviving
CongressionalAuthority Under the War PowersResolution
Foreign policy considerations demand that American forces be rapidly
deployable, but a well-grounded approach to determine how force deployments should
be authorized must recognize that foreign policy interests are placed injeopardy when
the President acts without congressional consultation. Disagreements about policy

War Powers and the UnitedNations Security Council, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 159,
180 (1997) (arguing that the Resolution is ineffective, that the President should maintain
significant war power authority, and that the Congress should check presidential power by
its control of funds for military expenditures).
The Congressman who sponsored the Resolution asserts that President Bush sought
congressional deliberations on the Gulf War only to placate congressional objections to
unilateral executive authority:
[President Bush] made it appear as if he was not about to consult us one way
or the other. So we literally begged him ....

You can legitimately argue

whether the war was good policy, but the concept of making the Constitution
work was very important to us. It provided a legal basis for the President's
action.
Fascell, supra note 56, at 127 (explaining that analysis of the war power must also consider
the role that politics plays in military decision-making between Congress and the
President).
"' At least 53 members of Congress disagreed with the executive approach to the war
power in the Gulf War. As plaintiffs in Dellums v. Bush, these representatives challenged
the constitutionality of the President's authority to wage war against Iraq and sought an
injunction against U.S. military action. The court rejected the representatives' arguments,
holding that "[j]udicial restraint must, of course, be even further enhanced when the issue
is one-as here---on which the other two branches may be deeply divided." Dellums v.
Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1149 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 1990). In addition to rejecting challenges
from Congress to executive construction of the war power, the court also rejected challenges
from military personnel. See Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 518 (D.D.C. 1990) ("These
are indeed difficult times. The court must respect both the President's powers as well as the
powers of the nation's elected representatives in Congress. Interjecting the court into this
political process will only exacerbate the problems facing this nation. This lawsuit must be
dismissed.").
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between legislative and executive leadership create strife which reduces the ability of
the United States to speak to the world community with a single voice. This situation
is amplified when executive-legislative disagreement is created by force deployments
made pursuant to a Security Council consensus. The weight of U.S. commitment is
reduced when Security Council states know that American forces can be withdrawn
if Congress chooses to override the Executive's force commitment.
In light of this circumstance, there are grounds for amending the Resolution's
consultation requirement to accommodate a modern scenario: when the Security
Council deliberates on an Article 42 decision to authorize military force, the executive
branch should be required to consult with congressional leaders before agreeing to
commit troops to foreign engagement in any deployment that has an estimated
military duration beyond sixty days. The ideal procedure for executive-legislative
consultation can only be formulated by political bargaining between the executive and
the legislative branches-although one compelling possibility would be to create a
congressional consultative group, consisting of a core of bipartisan congressional
leaders, who could grant approval for short-term deployments.'' This proposal has
the advantage of expanding Congress' role in the decision-making process, while
preserving a low threshold for swift decision making.
C. The Rationales: CongressionalConsultation,Law, andInternationalSecurity
The Congressman who sponsored the Resolution noted, "You cannot separate
law and politics."' 2 This idea carries weight in national security, when military
.1 See generally Richard F. Grimmett, Multinational Peacekeeping Operations:
Proposalsto Enhance Congressional Oversight (updated Nov. 25, 1996) (visited Feb. 9,
2000) <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/95-006.htm> (analyzing various proposals for
enhancing the role of Congress in military deployments). This core group of leaders could
grant a tentative approval, subject to overturn by Congress, for commitments limited to
military estimates; the time duration of approval could be extended as necessary.
One scholar suggests a consultative group comprised of 18 congressional members:
the Speaker of the House, the House Majority Leader, the House Minority Leader, the
President pro tempore of the Senate, the Senate Majority Leader, the Senate Minority
Leader, along with the chairman and ranking members of the following committees:
Senate Foreign Relations, House Foreign Affairs, Senate Armed Services, House Armed
Services, Senate Intelligence, and House Intelligence. See FISHER, WAR POWER, supranote
2, at 194 ("This core group of eighteen should be expanded, depending on the issue, to
include other members of Congress who have special expertise and experience. However,
consultation is not a legal substitute for full congressional action."). One approach to
international relations theory suggests that national security concerns would be enhanced
by including the leading committee members from committees relevant to national security.
See infra notes 111-28 and accompanying text (discussing the realist theory of international
relations).
102

Fascell, supra note 56, at 123.
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intervention may be compelling for foreign policy reasons, and congressional
consultation may appear to create obstacles to force commitments. It follows that the
viability of reform in the modus vivendi between Congress and the President in war
powers should be analyzed under two frameworks: (1) legal considerations on the
constitutionality ofwar powers reform; and (2) political considerations that evaluate
the international security implications of prioritizing congressional consultation.
1. The Legal Rationale
In the famous Steel Seizure Cases °3 in 1952, Justice Jackson's concurrence
formulated three analyses of presidential authority. First, when the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied congressional authorization, the President's
authority is at its maximum.'0 4 Second, when the President acts with an absence of
express approval or disapproval from Congress, the President's action must fall
within his independent powers. Additionally, there is a "zone of twilight," in which
the President and Congress may have overlapping authority or in which authority is
uncertain. 0 5 In such circumstances, congressional inaction may invite presidential
authority. In this area, any actual "test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law."'0 6 Third, when the President acts in contradiction to the will of
Congress, he "can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter." ' 7
,03See Younstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding that the
President cannot seize a private steel company to facilitate munitions production).
"o4 See id at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the President acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.").
loS See id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
'o
Id (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson stated:
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or
in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable,
if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.
Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
107 Id. (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson stated:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter .... Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Justice Jackson's framework provides a compelling legal lens through which
American military force commitments to multilateral operations should be viewed.
Typically, an executive decision to commit forces to a U.N. intervention lies in the
"zone oftwilight" ofJustice Jackson's second scenario. Both the textual bifurcation
of the war power under the Constitution and the Framers' intent suggest a
constitutional overlap in the powerto make military decisions. In addition, Congress
may be acquiescing to the authority of the President because it lacks the political
capital or certainty to challenge a military intervention, especially one that may have
support in the world community. Finally, party membership may determine loyalties
to the favor or disfavor of an executive usurpation of the war power.' 08
When the Executive consults with a core group of congressional leaders before
deploying American troops into theaters of risk, the executive action moves
asymptotically from Justice Jackson's first scenario, where executive action moves
in a constitutionally tenuous "zone of twilight," towards Justice Jackson's second
scenario, where the Executive's constitutional authority maximized because it is
supported by an express or implied congressional authorization. While this
consultation does not authoritatively establish congressional support, or prohibit
Congress from later calling for a reduction in American military engagements, it
bridges the gap between the Framers' mandate for congressional authority over war
and the security mandate for the U.N. delegate to make reliable U.S. commitments
for military intervention that fall short of declared wars." 9 In the absence of such
consultation, executive authority runs unchecked. As Justice Jackson observed,
"[O]nly Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.""'

o See id at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[R]ise of the party system has made a
significant extraconstitutional supplement to real executive power.... Party loyalties and
interests ... extend his effective control into branches of government other than his own

and he often may win, as a political leader, what he cannot command under the
Constitution.").
"oCf Koh, supra note 29, at 1326-35 (advocating for a congressional group that could
consult with the Executive in the foreign policy areas in which Congress shares authority
as part of a structural reformulation of authority in foreign affairs). As Professor Koh notes,
there are significant benefits to this type of structural reformulation political jurisdiction in
foreign affairs:
[A core group of congressional members] could provide the Executive with the
benefit of its deliberative judgments without demanding unacceptable sacrifices
in flexibility, secrecy, or dispatch .... Moreover ...this core group would

consist of congressional leaders who would be directly accountable to the entire
membership, and who would have the stature to express to the President views
that might not come from his own subordinates.
Id.
at 1327.
,' Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Co., 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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The International Security Rationale

In addition to a legal basis for including Congress in military decisions made
pursuant to a Security Council Resolution, national security considerations drawn
from international relations theory ("IR") further bolster the necessity of
congressional support for military commitments. '
Two main schools ofthought structure the modern debate in IR: the "neoliberal"
school and the "realist" school." 2 Neoliberalism provides a rich source of ideas to
justify the viability of multilateral U.N. intervention as a means to international
stability. 1 3 Realism provides a more compelling basis for analyzing national security
decisions, however, because realism has wielded more influence on political thought
than has neoliberalism." 4
...See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern InternationalRelations Theory: A Prospectusfor
InternationalLawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 340 (describing how international law and

international relations can each contribute to the study of each other).
..
2 See generally CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR., CONTROVERSIES
RELATIONS THEORY:

REALISM AND THE NEOLIBERAL CHALLENGE

IN INTERNATIONAL

(1995) (contrasting

realist and neoliberal perspectives on post-Cold War IR).
1'

See generally id at 4 (delineating neoliberalism's assumptions that evince support

for the viability of the U.N. as an instrument for international order: (1) "[w]ar and
injustice are international problems that require collective or multilateral action rather than
national efforts to eliminate them;" (2) "[i]nternational society must reorganize itself
institutionally to eliminate the anarchy that makes problems such as war likely;" and (3)
"[t]his goal is realistic because history suggests that global change and cooperation are not
only possible but empirically pervasive."). Thus, neoliberalism's focus on international
institutions accords with its conclusion that the U.N. provides an effective instrument to
bolster international security as an institution,rather than as a framework for facilitating
state action. In contrast, realism asserts that international organizations are useful in
international politics, but they are not viable as institutions independent of powerful states;
powerful states use international institutions as an instrument for affecting their national
interests. See REALISM: RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL, at xv (Benjamin Frankel ed.,
1996) (analyzing the realist interpretation of international organizations). Benjamin
Frankel asserts:
Realists do not say that [international] institutions or conventions are not
helpful. Institutions and agreements increase the knowledge states have of other
states' capabilities, they facilitate negotiations and ease exchanges and
interactions. This, however, is all they do. Institutions and conventions do not
foster new consciousness or fundamentally alter the anarchic state of
international relations. No state will sacrifice its interests (endanger its security,
undermine its welfare, jeopardize its future) in order to serve a larger
community.
Id.; see also infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (analyzing the anarchical nature of
the international political system).
114 See KEGLEY, supra note 112, at 6 (contrasting the influence of realism and
neoliberalism on security decisions). Charles W. Kegley, Jr., asserts:
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Realist theory has its origins in Thucydides, who asserted that the cause of the
Peloponnesian War centered on disparities in power between Athens and Sparta." 5
In its modern form, realism posits four assumptions about international politics
relevant to war powers analysis." 6 Each of these assumptions can be linked with a
Leaders and scholars alike organized their thoughts and images almost
exclusively in terms of [realism]. This reliance on realism to explain and
predict international developments was understandable. Realism found a fertile
ground in which to flourish during the conflict-ridden fifty-year period between
1939 and 1989. The lust for power, appetite for imperial expansion and
struggle for hegemony, a pervasive arms race, and obsession with military
security were in strong evidence. Realism accounted for these phenomena better
than did any other theoretical perspective.
Id.

Kegley also asserts that neoliberalism provides a viable challenge to realist thought
after the Cold War. See id This assertion may be true in academic circles, but war power
analysis is still best predicated on a realist paradigm. Until congressional actors begin to
assert a neoliberal vision of world politics, a realist vision will more accurately reflect the
parameters of legislative thought on national security issues.
Recent events suggest realism remains in force. For example, in contrast to
neoliberalism, realism rejects the viability of international organizations as a means of
achieving international security, independent of state power. See id. at 5 (delineating
realism's assumptions that evince opposition to the viability of the U.N. as an instrument
for international order: "Never entrust the task of self-protection to international
organizations or to international law."). If it ever abandoned realism, Congress has returned
to realist assumptions emphasizing the state, rather than international organizations, such
as the U.N., as the central instrument for mitigating international security threats. See, e.g.,
Grimmett, supra note 101, at 3 ("As costly multinational peacekeeping operations under
the aegis of the United Nations in Somalia and Bosnia have failed to produce the desired
outcomes, support in Congress and the country for American participation in these
operations has declined.").
"s

See, e.g., Mark V. Kauppi, Thucydides: Character and Capabilities,in ROOTS OF

142 (Benjamin Frankel ed., 1996) (noting the influence Thucydides has had on
realist thought). Kauppi notes:
While realists of all persuasions lay claim to Thucydides, those realists known
as power transition theorists have made the strongest case. Power transition
theorists convincingly argue that the essence of Thucydides' explanation for the
outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. involves the shift in relative
capabilities between two powerful countries.
Id. For the canoncial history of the Peloponnesian War reflecting realist ideas, see
THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Rex Warner trans., Penguin Books
1954) (ca. 400 B.C.) (analyzing the Peloponnesian War between Ahens and Sparta in the
fourth century B.C.).
REALISM

116

See generally REALISM: RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL, supranote 113 (offering

an exposition of modem realism and its implications for international politics); ROOTS OF
REALISM, supra note 115 (offering a history of realist thought in international relations);
KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR (1959) (offering a realist interpretation
of international relations); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
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rationale for reformulating the Resolution to affect greater congressional consultation
in decisions to use force.
The first assumption of realism is that states, rather than international
organizations, are the central units of international politics; international
organizations "merely reflect the interests of their member states.""' 7 This has
implications for war powers jurisprudence. If states are the central units of
international politics, even in multilateral military action, then it is imperative that the
international actors (states) enhance their credibility with their allies and adversaries;
otherwise, neither will believe them. As one scholar notes, "Credibility is the
currency of diplomacy." ' 8 Consequently, this creates a security rationale to include
Congress in decisions to engage in multilateral deployments, because a Congress that
challenges an executive deployment made without congressional approval will reduce
U.S. credibility in the international community."'
The second assumption of realism is that states pursue their national interests in
an international political system that is anarchic. 120 It is important to note that this
does not mean the international system is in chaos.' 2' States are inclined towards
peaceful cooperation when it is in their interest to do so. There is no authority above
states, however, to prevent a state from invoking force when it discerns force to be
an effective means of achieving its national interests.'2 2 This proposition has
(1979) (offering an exposition of the theoretical principles of realist thought).
117 REALISM: RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL, supra note 113, at xiv.
118 Glennon, The Commitment, supra note 68, at 548.
,1 For example, in Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990), analyzed supra
note 100, congressional representatives challenged an executive deployment. Until a
congressional challenge to an executive deployment has been resolved to allow the
deployment, it would be illogical for a foreign state to feel confident that the United States'
deployment will be maintained. This undermines the benefits the United States might
receive from making a commitment to engage in multilateral peacekeeping operations.
20 See REALISM: RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL, supra note 113, at xv (analyzing
realist assumptions about international relations).
121 See id. ("A state of anarchy is not a war of all against all. Wars are costly, and their
results are unpredictable, so states have an incentive to pursue their interests by other
means.... When it is no longer in a state's interest to abide by a [peaceful] convention, the
state withdraws from the convention .... ).
122 See, e.g., WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR, supra note 116, at 160 (describing
the international political system). Neorealist Kenneth Waltz describes the realist analysis
of the anarchical system in world politics:
A state will use force to obtain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for
success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace.
Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time
use force to implement its policies. Because any state may at any time use force,
all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay
the cost of weakness. The requirements of state action are, in this view,
imposed by the circumstances in which all states exist.
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implications for war powers jurisprudence. Congress is better suited to assess
multilateral deployments as a means to achieve national interests in an anarchical
political system.J23 Congressional actors have an interest in being responsive to their
electors that transcends presidential accountability.' 24 In addition, if significant
military action is within U.S. interests, then major military, deployments should
preserve an enhanced role for Congress because a "national interest," by definition,
must be derived from the will of the Congress, and a priori,from the will of the
governed.
The third and fourth assumptions are closely linked, and they build from the first
two realist assumptions about international politics. Specifically, the third
assumption of realism is that states seek to maximize their security or their power. 25
The fourth assumption of realism is that the international system is responsible for
state conduct on the international scene. 26 Thus, in an international political system
predicated on anarchy, "' [S]overeign nations are moved to action by what they regard
as their national interests rather than by the allegiance to a common good which, as
a common standard of justice, does not exist in the society of nations."",127 This
proposition has implications for war powersjurisprudence. An international political
system predicated on anarchy creates a mandate for garnering security. Security is
enhanced when commitments to collective security schemes are not subject to
subsequent nullification by a discontent Congress. This represents an IR corollary
to Justice Jackson's first category of presidential power: when the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied congressional authorization, the President's
authority is at its maximum. Through a realist lens, this suggests that when

Id.
'23 See Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the President Under the
War Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 91 (1984) ("Presidents, mired in the
executive responsibilities of government, sometimes lose touch with the tide of domestic
political opinion. The unadorned views ofwise individuals outside the executive branch can
play an important and useful role.").
124 As Thomas Jefferson wrote, "'We have already given in example one effectual check
to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the
Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay."' REVELEY, supra
note 31, at 106 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
125

See REALISM: RESTATEMENTS AND RENEWAL, supra note 113, at xv (analyzing

realist assumptions about IR).
126 See id Realists' views on the anarchical nature of international politics reveal two
schools of thought: offensive realism and defensive realism. Offensive realists argue that
the scarcity of security causes states to adopt offensive strategies, often resulting in war.
Defensive realists argue that security is readily available, causing states to adopt defensive
strategies. See id
127

MICHAEL JOSEPH SMITH, REALIST THOUGHT FROM WEBER TO KISSINGER 145 (1986)

(quoting HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (1948)).
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presidential action and congressional authorization support a military force
deployment, security is maximized. 8
CONCLUSION

If in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification of the
Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an
amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be
no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the
instrument ofgood, it is the customary weapon by which free governments
are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in
permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any
29
time yield.

This conclusion relies on theoretical constructions about collective action in
international relations, illustrated by the Stag Hunt parable originally formulated by JeanJacques Rousseau. See Abbott, supra note 111, at 368 n. 174 (analyzing the Stag Hunt
parable). Abbott explains:
In the parable, all members of a group of primitive hunters prefer to eat
venison. All must cooperate in order to capture a stag; if one hunter "defects,"
the stag will escape. Whenever a hunter sees a hare pass by, however, he is
tempted to leave the group and pursue it.A single hunter can catch a hare, and
will eat lightly, but the others, if they continue after the stag, will not eat at all.
If all abandon cooperation and hunt rabbits, all will eat lightly. [Realists] use
[the] Stag Hunt to illustrate the difficulty of international cooperation.
Id The theoretical implications of the Stag Hunt reveal that collective action, which may
bolster the payoff of all actors, is only feasible when all actors have assurance that no other
actor will defect. See id. at 368. ("[I]f one suspects that another player is likely to cease
cooperating, defection guarantees that one will at least avoid the worst outcome.").
This argument creates a security rationale for greater congressional inclusion in
military deployments. If Congress can either support or nullify an executive deployment
because its views were not factored into the initial deployment decision, mutual security
operations are threatened. Congress could choose to cry "foul" and recall U.S. military
forces. This amounts to a U.S. defection. Other actors lack the assurance to stay in the game
and "hunt the stag," because they lack assurance that the United States will not defect.
Furthermore, the mere potential of defection is enough to threaten the collective effort.
Congressional misgivings about the wisdom of executive military action, reported
worldwide, ostensibly reduce the assurance that other states (actors) have that the United
States will not defect from a multilateral operation. Note that during the Persian Gulf War,
President Bush feared the possibility that congressional discontent over the use of force
against Iraq might undermine U.S. leadership of the multilateral coalition against Iraq,
which would undermine efforts to reverse Iraqi aggression. See supra note 95 (analyzing
President Bush's consultation with Congress during the Persian Gulf War).
1 9 President George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796) in GEORGE
WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION 521 (W.B. Allen ed., 1988).
128
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History reveals a flow of military authority from the Congress to the President.
This trend should be tempered by considerations about the constitutionality of
unilateral executive authority and the consequences that executive authority, voidable
by a discontent Congress, would have on collective security efforts. A balance must
be struck between swiftness, secrecy, accountability, and constitutional authority.
Requiring the Executive to consult with a core group of legislative actors is one
possible approach to balance constitutional and diplomatic imperatives. There are
sound legal and strategic reasons to reinvigorate Congress' role in decisions to deploy
military forces in multilateral operations. Admittedly, there are no perfect solutions,
but the Constitution combines with collective security considerations to mandate that
war powers interpretations facilitate a consensus between the political branches of
government before forces are deployed into hostile theaters.
ALEXANDER C. L!NN

